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Lymphatic filariasis (LF) is a disfiguring
and debilitating parasitic disease that is
endemic in 81 countries, placing a stag-
gering 1.3 billion people at risk for filarial
infection [1]. In 1997, the World Health
Assembly resolved to eliminate LF as a
public health problem, and in 2000, the
Global Programme to Eliminate Lym-
phatic Filariasis (GPELF) was officially
launched. Coupled with the development
of essential diagnostic tools, the primary
strategy devised to achieve LF elimination
was to implement annual mass drug
administration (MDA) using combinations
of albendazole plus either diethylcarbam-
azine or ivermectin for at-risk populations
[2]. These single-dose treatment regimens
were chosen for their ability to significant-
ly reduce microfilaremia for periods of up
to one year, limiting the transmission
potential. Through generous donations of
drugs from GlaxoSmithKline and Merck
& Co., the global program began its first
treatments in 2000. Since then, 48 of the
81 endemic countries have implemented
MDA and almost 2 billion treatments have
been provided [1]. These treatments have
led to dramatic reductions in microfilare-
mia and have provided significant collat-
eral benefit by reducing soil-transmitted
helminthiasis [3,4]. Furthermore, more
than 6 million cases of hydrocele and 4
million cases of lymphedema have been
prevented in the last eight years, translat-
ing into more than 32 million disability-
adjusted life years averted [3]. Through
the efforts of a national program, China
became the first country to declare the
elimination of LF as a public health
problem, and in March 2008, the Repub-
lic of Korea also made a similar an-
nouncement [1].
Although significant progress has been
made since the inception of GPELF, there
are still many challenges that stand in the
way of success. At the onset of the global
program, the recommended strategy was
to administer annual MDA for four to six
years. At that time, this recommendation
was thought to be sufficient for interrupt-
ing transmission. As the program has
progressed, it has become increasingly
evident that although transmission appears
to have been interrupted in some areas
after only five rounds of MDA, this has not
been the case in other places [5,6].
Differences such as vector–parasite com-
plexes, initial infection prevalence, and
urban versus rural settings make it difficult
to design each elimination program in an
identical manner, and it is becoming clear
that MDA works better and more effi-
ciently in some areas than in others. For
example, especially important for MDA
strategies to be effective is the requirement
for adequate coverage and compliance
among eligible populations. Many pro-
grams have struggled to achieve the
recommended 80% coverage in part
because of differences in drug-delivery
strategies. However, the single greatest
challenge to programs may be the diffi-
culty or inability to reach a national scale.
Many countries are forced to make
difficult decisions about public health
allocations with limited financial resources
available and are, of necessity, heavily
dependent on external support to main-
tain their national LF programs. During
periods of difficult funding, a number of
programs have been forced to cut back or
skip MDAs altogether. However, there has
been very little effort to look at the impact
of missed MDA cycles on program
outcomes.
Haiti represents approximately 78% [7]
of the LF burden in the Americas, and the
LF program in Haiti is one that faces
many challenges. The National Program
to Eliminate LF in Haiti began in 2001.
Based on initial mapping results, com-
munes were stratified into high, moderate,
and low priority for treatment. Because of
limited resources, the decision was made
to focus on MDA in the highest-priority
settings, which represented areas with the
greatest public health need (determined by
antigen prevalence). The program scaled
up rapidly, and by 2005, 18 of 20 high-
priority communes (based on initial map-
ping; the commune of Port au Prince was
subsequently subdivided) had been treated
with a combination of diethylcarbamazine
and albendazole at least once. Of com-
munes with the greatest treatment need,
only Port au Prince and Gonaives, which
have challenging political and urban
environments, were not included.
Although the national program didn’t
begin until 2001, a pilot mass treatment
program began in Leogane the previous
year. The commune of Leogane comprises
both urban and rural zones and is located
approximately 30 km west of Port au
Prince, with an estimated population of
150,000. Before intervention, antigenemia
in this area was approximately 50% [6,8].
Nearly one year was spent on community
mobilization and training for community
health workers, and distribution posts were
selected to provide convenient access for
the communities being treated. Annual
treatment with a combination of diethyl-
carbamazine and albendazole was imple-
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selected according to WHO guidelines to
monitor the progress of the program [9].
The reported coverage for the first five
rounds of MDA ranged from 50% to
104%; the surveyed coverage was 71%
and 79% in 2000 and 2002, respectively
[6] (unpublished data).
After five rounds of MDA (2000–2005),
antigen prevalence had decreased signifi-
cantly,from nearly 50%to15%.There was
also a significant reduction in microfilare-
mia from 15% to ,1% [6]. Although great
progress had beenmade after five roundsof
MDA, it was evident that additional rounds
of treatment were necessary. MDA was
carried out in October 2005; however,
2006 was a challenging year for the LF
program in Haiti. There was great civil
strife in the country, and this instability led
todecreaseddonorconfidence.Inthemidst
of the turmoil, it was difficult to convince
donors that the LF program would be able
to operate at the same level as in the years
past. As a result of this decreased confi-
dence, funding was interrupted and there
was no MDA either in Leogane or in the
other communes where MDA had been
carried out. With the resumption of
program activity in 2007, surveys were
conducted in two of the sentinel sites in
Leogane (Leogane town and Masson-
Mathieu), nearly two years after the most
recent MDA, giving insight into the impact
of the missed MDA.
In 2007, antigen prevalence in Leogane
town and Masson-Mathieu was 31.2% and
14.5%, respectively. Both findings repre-
sented significant increases (p,0.001) in
prevalence from 2005, consistent with
ongoing transmission in the area (Figure 1).
The results of confirmatory antigen and
antibody tests done on samples from
immunochromatographic test–positive indi-
viduals supported the conclusion that the
increase was real and not an artifact of
changes in sensitivity of the immunochro-
matographic test. Microfilaremia also in-
creased during this period in both sentinel
sites, from 0.6% to 6.4% in Leogane town
and 0.5% to 2.1% in Masson-Mathieu.
However, differences in blood volume used
for the slides in 2007 (60 mlv e r s u s2 0mli n
2005) make it difficult to draw direct
comparisons between the years. Although
the evidence strongly suggests that infection
levels have recrudesced as a consequence of
the missed MDA, it is important to
recognize that systematic noncompliance
may also have played a role. This problem
has been reported previously in Leogane
[10,11], and the reservoir of infection
represented by noncompliant persons may
have been responsible for the apparent
plateau in antigen prevalence observed in
2004 and 2005. Nonetheless, the missed
MDA allowed antigen prevalence in 2007 to
revert to nearly the levels found in 2003,
apparently losing at least two years’ worth of
progress.
ThislimitedexamplefromHaitibeginsto
give insight into the consequences of missed
MDAs and has broader implications for the
global program. The potential for recrudes-
cence of antigenemia is an obvious setback
to national programs, and the Haitian
experience has shown that there can be a
significant loss of investment if programs are
not sustained. In highly endemic settings
such as Haiti, a funding gap can inadver-
tently introduce additional obstacles in an
already challenging programmatic situation.
There are also less obvious issues that must
be considered. Inconsistent drug delivery
could lead to confusion and fatigue within
the communities as the necessary rounds of
MDA are prolonged over additional years.
These inconsistencies could resultin a loss of
credibility for the LF programs and ulti-
mately lead to a decline in political
commitment and support, a critical deter-
minant of the success of programs [5].
Irregular drug delivery extends the time
necessary to reduce infection levels below
the necessary threshold for eliminating
transmission and disease. This could allow
for the selection of parasites that develop
resistance to one or more of the drugs being
used.Althoughtherehasbeenlittleevidence
that lymphatic filarial parasites have devel-
oped drug resistance, the observation that
MDA exerts selective pressure on parasite
populations argues that programs should
be consistent in applying drug pressure
[12,13].
Figure 1. Immunochromatographic test prevalence in Leogane, Haiti (2000–2007). Antigen prevalence increased from 23.2% to 31.2% in
Leogane town and from 8.2% to 14.5% in Masson-Mathieu in 2007. There was no MDA in 2006. The dashed lines indicate antigen prevalence in 2007.
The total number of persons surveyed each year is indicated in the legend.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000443.g001
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programs, there must be an effort to
stabilize annual rounds of MDA as much
as possible. Achieving this stability re-
quires sustained political and social com-
mitment, careful planning to ensure ade-
quate drug supply, and consistent funding.
In stable political and funding climates,
programs can optimize opportunities to
achieve success. Perhaps the setback
observed in Haiti was a result of a strategic
error in the initial decision to focus on
high-prevalence communes that were
scattered geographically. Treatment in
these areas may have led to a decrease in
antigen prevalence, but the potential
contribution of adjacent areas to ongoing
transmission was not considered. In retro-
spect, it is difficult to know whether
treating an entire geographical region
would have been a better use of the
limited resources. However, this does not
obviate the need for continued, sustained
funding in any case, possibly for a longer
period than originally anticipated. Financ-
es remain the greatest barrier to the
expansion of LF programs, and limited
resources are the reality of the day.
However, strengthening partnerships can
potentially maximize the use of scarce
resources and promote financial stability.
With extensive geographical overlap of
neglected tropical diseases, there is great
opportunity to link control programs and
achieve program synergy [14]. Single-
disease programs should capitalize on the
burgeoning interest surrounding the inte-
gration of neglected tropical disease pro-
grams to create a framework for program
stability and success. Despite the setback in
Haiti, there should be a collective opti-
mism that the effort to eliminate LF can be
successful, through new partnerships and
programmatic linkages.
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